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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

I

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,

;

Case No. 890509-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of one count of
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii) (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989),
as the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly convicted

defendant of arranging to distribute a controlled substance.
standard of review for a bench trial is the clearly erroneous
standard set out in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987).

The

2.

Whether defendant has preserved for appeal his

claim that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
are unconstitutional as applied to him.

Ordinarily, reviewing

courts will not entertain issues raised for the first time on
appeal.

State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983), cert.

denied, Norton v Utah, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (1986).
3.

Whether the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

8(1)(a)(ii) are constitutional as applied to defendant.
Statutory provisions are given a strong presumption of validity,
In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 P.2d 633, 640
(Utah 1988), and reviewing courts give a lower court's statement
of the legal conclusion no particular deference, but review it
for correctness, State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah
1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful
distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
(1990), on February 28, 1989 (Record [hereafter R.] at 4-6).
The matter proceeded to a trial to the bench on June
13, 1989, again with Judge Wilkinson presiding (R. at 57 and
Transcript of trial [hereafter T.Tr.] at 3-4). The court found
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defendant guilty as charged (R. at 57 and T.Tr. at 46-47).

On

July 21, 1989, the court sentenced defendant to a term of not
less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.

That sentence was stayed and defendant placed on

probation for eighteen months with certain conditions (R. at 5859).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 23, 1989, Agent Albert Acosta of the Utah
Division of Investigations, Department of Public Safety, worked
with a confidential informant to set up a purchase of cocaine
(T.Tr. at 6 and 14-15).

The informant contacted Lorraine Coates

who was to introduce Agent Acosta and the informant to a dealer
named Paco (T.Tr. at 6). Agent Acosta was told to meet Coates
and Paco at a gas station at 5300 South Redwood Road in Salt Lake
County (T.Tr. at 6 and 14-15).
When Agent Acosta arrived at that location, an
individual named Chris Baker approached Acosta's vehicle and got
into the passenger side (T.Tr. at 7 and 16).

Baker instructed

Acosta to drive to 5600 South 900 East, to an apartment in that
area (T.Tr. at 7). Following the instructions, Agent Acosta
followed a pickup truck to the Rivendell apartments at that
address (T.Tr. at 7 and 17). At Baker's direction, Agent Acosta
parked his vehicle at the apartment complex (T.Tr. at 7 and 17).
Shortly thereafter, defendant walked up to the agent's
vehicle and got in the passenger seat (T.Tr. at 8 and 17). After
introducing himself, defendant told Agent Acosta that they would
have to drive to a 7-Eleven on 5600 or 5300 South 1300 East

(T.Tr. at 8 and 18). Defendant told Acosta that they would have
to make a telephone call at that location and "the man would
bring the cocaine to that location." (T.Tr. at 8 and 18).
Defendant remained in Acosta's car and Baker and the informant
also got in the vehicle to ride to the 7-Eleven (T.Tr. at 8 and
17-18).

At the 7-Eleven, defendant and Baker got out of the

vehicle and walked to the telephone booths where they approached
a man who was using the telephone (T.Tr. at 8-9 and 19-20).

That

man was later identified as Paco (T.Tr. at 9).
After defendant and Baker spoke with Paco, Agent Acosta
told the informant to call Coates over to Acosta's car (T.Tr. at
9).

Acosta told her that he was "uncomfortable with having

[defendant] and [Baker] with [him]." (T.Tr. at 9). She told
Acosta that she understood and called Paco over; Agent Acosta
also told Paco that he did not want defendant around (T.Tr. at 910).

Defendant had no further involvement while the cocaine

purchase was completed at Paco's direction (T.Tr. at 10-13 and
20-23).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence produced at trial amply supported the
trial court's determination that defendant arranged to distribute
cocaine.

Defendant's actions were in furtherance of the drug

deal and his statements to the undercover agent demonstrated that
he acted with the requisite knowledge and intent.
Defendant has waived his right to challenge the
constitutionality of the arranging statute by his failure to
challenge the statute at the trial court level.
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Failure to

preserve the issue below precludes challenging the
constitutionality on appeal.
Even if this Court reaches the issue of the
constitutionality of the arranging statute, defendant's argument
fails on the merits.

Defendant does not challenge the facial

constitutionality of the statute but does challenge its
constitutionality as applied to him.

The actions and statements

of defendant clearly demonstrate that his actions were not
innocent.

No person of ordinary intelligence could have failed

to perceive that the arranging statute applied to defendant's
actions.

Defendant directed the undercover agent to the location

where the agent could meet with the drug dealer who obtained the
cocaine for the agent.
distribution.

By doing this, defendant aided the

He knew what he was doing and that his actions

were part of the arrangement to distribute the cocaine.

The

trial court did not broaden the meaning of the statute by
determining that defendant's actions were proscribed by the
statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION OF
DEFENDANT FOR ARRANGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
Defendant's first claim of error is that the trial
court committed clear error when it found the evidence sufficient
to convict defendant of arranging the distribution of a
controlled substance.

The standard of review in bench trials has been
clarified in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),
as applied to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-3526(g) (1982).

The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Walker,

743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), that, in reviewing a sufficiency of
evidence claim, the appellate court must not set aside the lower
court's verdict unless it is clearly erroneous.
at 193.

Walker, 743 P.2d

See also State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989);

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

The clearly

erroneous standard requires that "if the findings (or the trial
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the
findings (or verdict) will be set aside."
193.

Walker, 743 P.2d at

However, as this Court has noted, the application of this

standard to bench trials "does not eliminate the traditional
deference afforded the fact finder to determine the credibility
of witnesses."

State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) (citing Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); State v.
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) ("it is not our function
to determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom")); see also State v.
Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983).
The legislature, in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
(1990), has declared it
unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:

_£_

(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled
or counterfeit substance[.]
This subsection was amended in 1987 to what it essentially now
reads.

Prior to 1987, distribution of a controlled substance and

arranging the distribution of a controlled substance were
separate subsections of the statute and much of the case law on
arranging focused on that separation.

In response to that case

law, the legislature amended the statute to include distribution
and arranging in the same subsection; this amendment did not
change the substance of the statute in respect to the issues
presented in this appeal.

While the pre-1987 cases focused on

the distinction between distribution and arranging because of
their being in different subsections, that distinction no longer
is critical.
1989).

See State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 (Utah Ct. App.

The pre-amendment case law is still instructive, however,

for defining the crime of arranging to distribute a controlled
substance.
Two cases specifically deal with the interpretation of
this crime.

In the first, State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah

1979), Harrison challenged the constitutionality of the arranging
statute which is the precursor to the present one, claiming that
it was vague and overly broad.

The Utah Supreme Court upheld the

statute, stating:
A statute may legitimately proscribe a broad
spectrum of conduct with a very few words, so
long as the outer perimeters of such conduct
are clearly defined. The statute in question
accomplishes this by specifying that any
activity leading to or resulting in the

distribution . . . of a controlled substance
must be engaged in knowingly or with intent
that such distribution would, or would be
likely to, occur. Thus, any witting or
intentional lending of aid in the
distribution of drugs, whatever form it
takes, is proscribed by the act.
. . .

[I]n the present situation, the citizen is
put on notice by the statute that, if he
intends the distribution . . . of a
controlled substance, any act in furtherance
of an arrangement therefor constitutes the
criminal offense described by the statute.
601 P.2d at 923-24 (emphasis added).

See also State v. Gray, 717

P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986) (quoting the language from
Harrison defining arranging).
In the present case, defendant's actions supported the
trial court's determination that defendant arranged for the
distribution of cocaine.

There is no argument that cocaine was

distributed to Agent Acosta by Paco; neither is there any real
dispute as to defendant's actions in this matter.

Defendant's

claim is that his actions did not rise to the level of arranging
to distribute a controlled substance.
Defendant's acts in furtherance of the distribution of
the cocaine were to direct the narcotics agent to the person who
would eventually take the buy money, purchase the cocaine, and
deliver the drug to the agent.

Defendant entered Agent Acosta's

car at a meeting point and directed the agent to another place
where they would "call somebody and they would bring cocaine to
us [Acosta and defendant] there."

(T.Tr. at 8).

Defendant

traveled with Agent Acosta to the next meeting place, left
Acosta's vehicle and approached the man who eventually secured
-Q_

the drug (T.Tr. at 8-9). The fact that defendant's involvement
ceased at that point is attributable to Agent Acosta's request
that defendant no longer be involved (T.Tr. at 9-10).

The fact

that defendant directed Agent Acosta to the drug dealer and that
defendant approached the dealer before the dealer contacted
Acosta support the verdict of the trial court.

Defendant's

actions fall into the language of State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366
(Utah 1987).

In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction

for distribution of a controlled substances, stating that Fixel
did not purport to merely find, direct, and
introduce the officer to another drug dealer.
. . .

The facts in the instant cases do not
support a "classic case" of arranging a drug
sale.
744 P.2d at 1370 (emphasis added).

Part of a "classic case" of

arranging a distribution, evidently, would be directing an
officer to the drug dealer.

In the present case, that is exactly

defendant's activity.
Defendant's argument in Subpoint C is that there is a
"but for" test for determining that a person arranged to
distribute a controlled substance.

Under this argument,

defendant could not be convicted if the distribution would have
occurred without his participation.
which supports this proposition.

There is no case law in Utah

The case law cited in Harrison

and Gray above is contradictory to defendant's position.

Those

cases state that "any witting or intentional lending of aid in
the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed
by the act."

Harrison# 601 P.2d at 923. Nothing requires that a

person's actions be so integral to the distribution that the
distribution could not occur without that person's participation.
Any knowledgable lending of aid, in whatever form, is sufficient
for conviction.

In the present case, defendant directed the

agent to the dealer, demonstrating knowledge by telling the agent
that they would make a phone call and someone would bring the
cocaine.

Defendant then approached the dealer who was speaking

on the telephone.

From that, the trier of fact could have

inferred that defendant was contacting the dealer about Agent
Acosta's presence.

These are acts in furtherance of the

arrangement to distribute which clearly support defendant's
conviction.
Even if a Mbut for" requirement existed, defendant's
actions were a necessary part of the arrangement.

Had he not

directed Agent Acosta to the location where Paco was waiting, the
deal would not have occurred.

That someone else might have given

the directions or another arrangement might have been made begs
the issue.

The evidence is that defendant gave the directions,

directions which directly led to the connection between Agent
Acosta and the dealer.

The completion of the arrangement to

distribute cocaine occurred because defendant facilitated it.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO THE ARRANGING STATUTE BY FAILING
TO RAISE THE ISSUE BELOW.
Defendant next challenges the arranging statute as
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to him.

The

predecessor statute was held to be constitutional on its face in
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979).
-in-

By his failure to raise the constitutionality issue
below# defendant has waived his right to appeal that issue.
It is a fundamental principle of appellate
review that matters not raised at the trial
level cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. See, e.g., State v. John, 770 P.2d
994, 995 (Utah 1989).

Moreover, this principle applies equally
to constitutional challenges not presented
below, but raised subsequently on appeal.
Although reviewing courts will, in the
exceptional or extraordinary case, overlook a
party's failure to raise constitutional
challenges in the proceedings below,
[defendant] has not persuaded us of the
existence of such exceptional circumstances
in this case.
In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

See also

State v. Anderson, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah March 6,
1990).

The record in the present cases is devoid of any claim

below that the arranging statute was unconstitutionally applied
to defendant.

Neither has defendant advanced any basis for this

Court to overlook his failure to preserve the issue.
Consequently, he is precluded from now raising the matter.
POINT III
EVEN IF DEFENDANT HAD PROPERLY PRESERVED THE
ISSUE, THE ARRANGING STATUTE WAS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO HIM.
If this Court decides to address the issue of the
constitutionality of the arranging statute despite defendant's
waiver, the argument fails on the merits.

The standard of

reviewing the constitutionality of a statute or rule is given in
In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct.# 754 P.2d 633 (Utah
1988), as:

legislative enactments are endowed with a
strong presumption of validity and will not
be declared unconstitutional unless there is
no reasonable basis upon which they can be
construed as conforming to constitutional
requirements.
754 P.2d at 640.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a vagueness challenge
to a statute in State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470 (Utah 1981), in
which it said:
A statute is not unconstitutionally vague
if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited. .
. . The statute need only be as definite and
certain as the subject matter permits.
636 P.2d at 471 (citations omitted).

Using this standard for

determining the facial constitutionality of the arranging
statute, the Utah Supreme Court has already determined in
Harrison that the statute is as specific as the subject matter
permits.
Defendant appears to be arguing that he was not given
sufficient notice by that statute that his activities fell within
the proscription of the statute. A similar argument was raised
by the petitioners in Bouie v. City of Columbia/ 378 U.S. 347
(1964)/ in which the standard was set out ass
"The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute. The underlying principle is that no
man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed."
378 U.S. at 351 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612/
617 (1954)).

In Bouie/ the United States Supreme Court reversed
-12-

the petitioners' convictions because, although the statute was
facially narrow and precise, its application was unexpectedly and
retroactively broadened by the state courts to include the
actions of the petitioners.
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has defined, in
Harrison and Gray, the meaning of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance.

The definition given is a common sense one

which comports with the general definition of the term "to
arrange."

The statute gives "a person of ordinary intelligence

fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden."
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617. The trial court did not
unconstitutionally broaden the meaning of the statute when it
determined that defendant's actions fell within the meaning of
the statute.

Defendant told Agent Acosta where to drive in order

to call the drug dealer and have the dealer bring the cocaine to
them at that location.

A person of ordinary intelligence has

fair notice that directing an individual to a meeting with a drug
dealer, with knowledge that the meeting would result in the
distribution of cocaine, is an act which assists in the
arrangement to distribute the drug.

Defendant's actions were not

innocuous such that he would not be expected to know that the
actions would lead to a drug deal.

His actions and statements to

the narcotics agent were accomplished with the intent to further
the distribution.

They were not innocent actions and statements

which were unconstitutionally brought within the proscription of
the arranging statute.

1 -3^

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / V

day of May, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

(i,

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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